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Abstract 
We study stock market reactions to the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 in order to assess investors’ 
expectations about the effects of leaving the European Union on the UK economy. Our results suggest 
that initial stock price movements were driven by fears of a cyclical downturn and by the sterling 
depreciation following the referendum. We also find tentative evidence that market reactions to two 
subsequent speeches by Theresa May (her Conservative Party conference and Lancaster House 
speeches) were more closely correlated with potential changes to tariffs and non-tariff barriers on UK-
EU trade, indicating that investors may have updated their expectations in light of the possibility of a 
hard Brexit. We do not find a correlation between the share of EU migrants in different industries and 
stock market returns. 
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1 Introduction
On 23 June 2016, the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union. This decision is likely to
be the most important change in UK economic policy for a generation. Most studies conducted
prior to the referendum concluded that the long-run e¤ect of a UK exit from the European
Union (Brexit) would be a reduction in British living standards (see for example, Dhingra et
al. 2017; HM Treasury, 2016; OECD, 2016; NIESR, 2016). Because Brexit will not take place
before March 2019, it is too early to evaluate the actual long-run impact on the UK economy.
However, an increasing number of studies have documented that the referendum has already
had negative short-term consequences such as lower GDP growth and higher ination (see Born
et al., 2017; Breinlich et al., 2017).
In this paper, we add to the emerging literature on the short-run e¤ects of Brexit by studying
stock market reactions to the referendum result and subsequent policy announcements that
claried the likely form Brexit would take the speeches by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa
May, at the Conservative Party conference in October 2016 and at Lancaster House in January
2017.
Besides providing direct evidence on share prices and the associated changes in stock market
capitalisation and wealth, we hope that stock price reactions will also be useful to gauge the
future economic impact of Brexit. Share prices are, in essence, aggregates of all information
available to market participants at any given point in time. They reect expectations about the
future protability of individual companies and sectors. Expected future changes in economic
conditions such as changes in trade barriers post-Brexit will thus lead to immediate stock price
reactions. Of course, market participants may be wrong, and share price movements might not
correctly capture the e¤ects of such changes. But given the information aggregation function
of stock markets, share price reactions capture the consensus viewof a large number of well-
informed economic actors such as banks, insurance companies and investment funds. They are
thus a useful alternative to estimates based on the work of individual experts, which form the
basis of existing forecasts. Indeed, this is the motivation behind a large body of stock market
event studies that use share price reactions to specic policy or regulatory events to infer likely
future e¤ects (see Binder, 1998, for a survey).
For each of our three events, we estimate abnormal returns for up to 350 UK-listed rms
and regress these returns on indicators capturing exposure to the potential e¤ects of a future
exit from the European Union. Besides standard variables such as rm size and protability,
we use rmsexport and import status, their engagement in EU and UK markets, and whether
they report in currencies other than sterling. We also look at sector-level variables such as
likely future EU tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers, business cycle sensitivity, and the share of EU
immigrants in the workforce of an industry.
We nd that stock price changes on 24 June, the rst trading day after the referendum,
are best explained by variables capturing rmsdependence on the UK market, business cycle
sensitivity, and rms export status and reporting currency. We interpret these results as
evidence that initial market reactions were driven by fears of an economic slowdown in the UK
and by the consequences of the steep depreciation of sterling that followed the Leave vote. By
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contrast, prospective trade barriers do not have a signicant impact, suggesting that market
participants either did not have su¢ cient knowledge about such barriers or considered their
imposition unlikely or unimportant.
This pattern is partially reversed when we look at reactions to Theresa Mays speeches at the
Conservative Party conference on 5 October 2016 and at Lancaster House on 17 January 2017.
In our baseline specication, the only variable that has a consistently signicant impact on 5
October 2016 are tari¤s. In particular, rms in sectors with higher current EU import tari¤s
saw lower abnormal returns. We believe this is consistent with the idea that Mays speech,
as well as other policy announcements during the Conservative Party conference, was the rst
o¢ cial conrmation that the UK would be aiming for an exit from both the EU customs union
and the single market (a so-called hard Brexit). The Lancaster House speech conrmed these
intentions and provided additional detail, as well as clarifying that the UK was prepared to
fall back on WTO trading terms in the event of a breakdown of negotiations with the EU.
Results are less clear-cut for this event, but we also nd negative coe¢ cients on both tari¤ and
non-tari¤ barriers in our abnormal returns regressions. Compared to our results for the day
after the referendum, however, these additional ndings appear somewhat less robust and are
sensitive to the length of the event window chosen. By contrast, the explanatory power of our
proxies for recessionary expectations and sterlings depreciation retain explanatory power over
longer event windows beyond 24 June 2016.
Our work contributes to a growing literature on the observed e¤ects of the Brexit vote
on the UK economy. It is most closely related to three papers that also study stock market
reactions to the referendum and subsequent events. Schiereck, Kiesel and Kolaric (2016) focus
more narrowly on the nancial sector, and show that stock prices of banks dropped sharply
after the referendum, particularly for EU banks. Ramiah, Pham and Moosa (2016) look at a
much wider range of sectors and discuss whether the observed price reactions are in line with
prior expectations. They do not regress abnormal returns on explanatory variables, however,
and thus cannot formally test hypotheses about di¤erential sector-level impacts advanced in
the pre-referendum literature. Similar to our paper, Davies and Studnicka (2017) correlate
abnormal returns with a number of explanatory variables, focusing on the role of global value
chains. We study a wider range of determinants, however, and link our choice of explanatory
variables more closely to forecasts made before the referendum. This makes our results more
relevant for a comparison of expert forecasts with the expectations of market participants.
For example, we show that investors shared concerns regarding the potential for an economic
downturn stressed by pre-referendum forecasts as well as (to a lesser extent) the importance of
future trade barriers.
The present paper is also related to a small number of studies which look at stock price
reactions to trade policy events. Hartigan, Kamma and Perry (1986, 1989), Hughes, Lenway
and Rayburn (1997), Bloningen, Tomlin and Wilson (2004), and Crowley and Song (2014) look
at stock price reactions to sector-specic anti-dumping duties. Grossman and Levinsohn (1989)
use stock price reactions to test the specic factors model of international trade. Moser and
Rose (2014) estimate the impact of regional trade agreements on aggregate stock market indices,
and Brander (1991), Thompson (1993) and Breinlich (2014) follow stock price movements sur-
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rounding the ratication process of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989. Our paper
di¤ers from these studies in that we look at stock market reactions to an arguably much more
signicant policy change that is expected to have strong e¤ects beyond its direct implications
for trade policy. In contrast to the literature on free trade agreements, Brexit also presents an
interesting policy experiment in that it is expected to increase, rather than lower, future trade
barriers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the mechanisms through
which Brexit may a¤ect stock prices. Section 3 discusses the stock market event study method-
ology we use. Section 4 describes the specic events as well as our explanatory variables and
data sources in more detail. Section 5 presents results for our abnormal returns regressions and
carries out a number of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic Mechanisms
The stock market response to the Brexit referendum shockis expected to be greater for rms
that are more exposed to the shock and its consequences. The shock has several di¤erent
dimensions. First, the referendum result led to an immediate depreciation of sterling. On
24 June 2016 the pound depreciated by 8.1% against the US dollar and 5.8% against the euro.
Second, leaving the EU could lead to major changes in future trade and migration policy. Third,
the Leave vote increased uncertainty about UK economic policy and may have caused investors
to downgrade their expectations for future UK growth in both the short-run and over longer
horizons.
The impact of the depreciation of sterling depends on rmsparticipation in international
markets. Multinational rms that earn revenue in currencies other than sterling will experience
a direct increase in their sterling-denominated earnings following the depreciation. This is likely
to raise their market value, since we study stock prices quoted in sterling. The depreciation may
also boost exportersprots in foreign markets through increased competitiveness and higher
markups, while negatively a¤ecting importers by increasing the cost of foreign goods.
Once the UK leaves the EU, it may no longer be a member of the EUs single market or
customs union. Instead, it might sign a free trade agreement with the EU or it could trade with
the EU under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Trading on WTO terms would lead
to higher tari¤s between the UK and the EU. Brexit is also likely to increase border non-tari¤
barriers such as customs procedures and rules of origin requirements. These barriers would
be particularly costly for rms with complex international supply chains. To the extent that
there is regulatory divergence between the UK and the EU after Brexit, exporters will also face
additional costs of complying with EU product standards. Overall, exposure to future changes
in UK-EU trade barriers is higher for rms that participate in international trade through
either exporting or importing, for multinational rms with a¢ liates in EU countries and for
rms in sectors where the EU currently has high tari¤ or non-tari¤ barriers on trade with WTO
members.
Since high levels of EU immigration were arguably an important driver of the Leave vote,
it is possible that the UK will impose tighter restrictions on EU immigration after Brexit.
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Consequently, rms employing a high share of EU immigrants may be more a¤ected by the
Leave vote, as they could su¤er from a reduction in labor supply.
Before the referendum a majority of forecasters predicted a slowdown in economic growth or
even a recession in the event of a Leave victory. Thus, rms in sectors that are less recession-
proofmay be expected to su¤er more in the aftermath of the referendum. Since the likelihood
of a slowdown or a recession depends on investorsexpectations about the form Brexit will take,
the impact of policy announcements such as Theresa Mays speeches at the Conservative Party
conference and at Lancaster House could also depend on rmsbusiness cycle sensitivities.
Finally, exposure to Brexit may also be related to rm characteristics such as performance
and size. Larger and more protable rms might be more resilient and better able to withstand
any negative e¤ects of Brexit. However, such rms are also likely to be more engaged in the in-
ternational economy through trade or foreign investment. Consequently, the overall correlation
of these characteristics with exposure to Brexit is ambiguous.
The next two sections describe how we test the importance of these mechanisms in explaining
stock price responses to the Brexit vote. We rst explain the methodology used for estimating
abnormal stock returns and then discuss the variables employed to capture the di¤erent channels
outlined above.
3 Methodology
We follow a two-step procedure to estimate the impact of a number of Brexit-related variables
on the abnormal returns of UK-listed rms. First, we estimate a model of normalstock returns
which adjusts for di¤erences in risk and other characteristics of stocks. A standard approach
in the literature is to use the so-called market model which relates the return rit on stock i at
time t to a stock-specic constant i and the return on the market portfolio, Rmt (Campbell et
al., 1989; Binder, 1998):
rit = i + iRmt + eit; t 2 T1 (1)
where eit is the mean-zero random component of the return-generating process and T1 is the so-
called pre-event window of stock price data on which (1) is estimated. This method controls for
di¤erences in average returns across stocks (i), a stocks (non-diversiable) risk as measured by
i and movements in the market portfolio. On event dates, stock returns also have an abnormal
component ( it) which in the present context could be caused by the arrival of unexpected news
about Brexit and its e¤ects on the UK economy. Thus, on event dates stock returns are given
by:
rit = i + iRmt +  it + eit; t 2 T2: (2)
where T2 denotes the event window (for example, 24 June 2016 for our referendum event).
Having obtained estimates of i and i using stock price data from the pre-event window only,
we compute abnormal returns estimates (^ it) as a prediction error for the event window:
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^ it = rit   r^it = rit   ^i   ^iRmt; t 2 T2; (3)
where the predicted values, r^it = ^i+ ^iRmt, have been constructed using the pre-event window
estimates of i and i and the return on the market portfolio on the event day.
The second step is to model abnormal returns as a function of variables that explain variation
in abnormal returns across rms and sectors.
 it = +Xi + Zj + it; t 2 T2 (4)
where  it denotes the true abnormal return of rm i on event date t,  is the regression constant,
Xi is a N  k1 vector of k1 rm-level regressors and Zj is an N  k2 vector of k2 sector-level
regressors where j denotes rm is industry. (N denotes the number of stocks included in the
regression.) We are interested in the signs and magnitudes of two coe¢ cient vectors,  and ,
which describe the correlation between our regressors and rm-level abnormal returns.1
An important issue for inference in event studies is the correct computation of standard
errors for the coe¢ cient estimates of interest ( and ). To get a clearer understanding of the
issues at stake, note from (2) and (3) that the relationship between the true abnormal return
( it) and the estimated abnormal return (^ it) is given by:
^ it =  it + (i   ^i) +

i   ^i

Rmt + eit =  it + it; t 2 T2 (5)
where it = (i   ^i) +

i   ^i

Rmt + eit. Furthermore, recall that we have assumed that
abnormal returns are a function of observables and a mean-zero random component () as given
by (4). Combining this expression with (5) allows us to state our basic estimating equation as
follows:
^ it =  it + it = +Xi + Zj + it + it = +Xi + Zj + "it; (6)
where "it = it + it. This expression shows that heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional de-
pendence of the residuals in regressions using estimated abnormal returns as the dependent
variable can arise from a number of sources. First, there could be heteroskedasticity and/or
cross-sectional dependence in the random component of the abnormal returns themselves (it).
Second, heteroskedasticity and/or cross-sectional dependence in the random component of the
return-generating process (eit) could be present. Finally, the forecasting error, (i   ^i) +
i   ^i

Rmt, might introduce both heteroskedasticity and dependence; this source of error
will become smaller as the length of the event period increases, however.
Karaath (1994) and Harrington and Shrider (2007) carry out Monte Carlo simulations
1 In principle, one could also directly use overall returns (rit) as the dependent variable in the second-stage
regression. We follow the standard practice in the event-study literature of using abnormal returns because we
want to examine the part of a stocks return that is driven by the event in question, rather than other return
patterns specic to the stock or its correlation with the market portfolio. If such stock-specic return patterns
are correlated with our second-stage regressors, then using overall returns would bias our coe¢ cient estimates.
In practice, overall and abnormal returns are highly correlated (in excess of 95% on all three event dates) and, in
our robustness checks below, we show that none of our qualitative ndings is changed when using overall returns
as the dependent variable.
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under di¤erent assumptions about the error terms eit and it and nd that simple OLS with
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors performs well compared to other methods such as
Feasible GLS. To account for possible cross-sectional dependence in "it, we will also cluster
standard errors by industry throughout this paper.2
4 Events and Data Sources
This section provides further information about the three events we will study, the choice of
explanatory variables for our abnormal returns regressions and our data sources.
4.1 Description of Events
We analyse stock market reactions to three events. The rst is the referendum on EU member-
ship itself. While the referendum took place on 23 June 2016, the outcome was not known until
the early hours of the next day and we use 24 June 2016 (a Friday) as our rst event date. The
referendum result took market participants by surprise. Opinion polls had predicted a close
vote but betting markets implied a probability of around 85% that the UK would choose to
remain in the EU (The Economist, 2016), reecting the conventional wisdom that undecided
voters would opt for the status quo. Once it became clear that the UK had voted to leave, the
pound depreciated sharply against all major currencies and share prices dropped when markets
reopened on 24 June.3
Our second and third events centre on two speeches by Theresa May outlining the likely
form Brexit would take. While the referendum determined that the UK would leave the EU, it
remained unclear which of the many possible post-Brexit arrangements would be chosen. For
example, would the UK continue to participate in the single market like Norway or form a cus-
toms union with the EU similar to Turkey? Our second and third events revealed information
about the likely nature of future EU-UK relations which is why they represent useful additions
to the analysis of post-referendum stock market reactions. Theresa Mays speech at the Con-
servative Party conference on 5 October 2016 outlined her vision for a post-Brexit UK. Most
observers deemed this vision incompatible with continued membership of the single market and
possibly the customs union. For example, May promised restrictions on future EU immigra-
tion and an end to the European Court of Justices jurisdiction in the UK, both of which are
incompatible with integral parts of the single market. Theresa Mays Lancaster House speech
on 17 January 2017 provided the rst detailed outline of the main objectives for the upcoming
exit negotiations with the EU and stated explicitly that the UK would leave the single market
and the customs union. It also claried that the UK was prepared to fall back on WTO trading
terms in the event of a breakdown of negotiations with the EU.
2See Cameron and Miller (2015) for further details as well as the relevant formula. In our data, rms are
classied by our main data provider Bureau van Dijk into one of 150 NACE 4-digit industries. However, the
number of industries actually included varies across regression samples and lies between 60 and 140. See below
for details.
3The FTSE All Shares declined by 3.8% on 24 June 2016. In our robustness checks, we will look at longer
event windows to capture potential anticipation e¤ects or delayed e¤ects of the referendum.
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While both speeches represented a shift towards a hard Brexit, it is less clear to what extent
they led to signicant changes in market participantsexpectations. In both cases, at least some
of the information contained in the speeches had been made available to the public beforehand.
Nevertheless, at least the Conservative Party conference speech seems to have caught investors
unprepared (Financial Times, 2016) and it led to a further 4.3% depreciation of sterling against
the US dollar in the week following 5 October. By contrast, there seems to have been a more
concerted e¤ort to prepare markets for the Lancaster House speech as information about some
of its key points had been released a couple of days earlier. Sterling in fact rose by about 1.4%
during the speech, presumably since investors valued greater certainty about the governments
plans for Brexit (Financial Times, 2017). In order to capture potential anticipation e¤ects,
we will use longer event windows (t-1 to t+1 and t-3 to t+3) for both the Conservative Party
conference and the Lancaster House speeches as part of our robustness checks.
4.2 Variables, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
For the computation of abnormal returns, we require information on stock prices and market
portfolio returns. Stock price information is taken from Datastream and information about
market portfolio returns is obtained from the websites of the London Stock Exchange and the
website investing.com. All returns in the paper are measured as percentage changes, implying
that abnormal returns are measured in percentage changes as well. We use the FTSE All
Share index as our market portfolio proxy in most specications. However, we will also check
the sensitivity of our results to using other proxies such as the MSCI Europe as well as to
controlling for multiple market indices representing Asia, Europe and the US.
Regarding our regressors, we consider various sets of rm- and sector-specic variables (Xi
and Zj in equation 6) as outlined below. These regressors are related to the economic mecha-
nisms discussed in Section 2.
First, we use a rms return on assets (ROA) and the value of its annual sales (in logs) as
measures of protability and size, respectively. We obtain data for both variables for the year
before the referendum from Bureau van Dijks Orbis database. The expected signs of these two
regressors are a priori unclear. As explained in Section 2, on the one hand more protable and
larger rms might be better able to withstand negative shocks. But on the other hand, they
might be more vulnerable as they tend to be more exposed internationally.
Second, we follow Davies and Studnicka (2017) in using information from Orbis on the
share of a rms subsidiaries in the UK and the rest of the EU, as well as the total count of
subsidiaries.4 Davies and Studnicka interpret the share variables as measuring the exposure of
a rms global value chain (GVC) to future trade barriers brought about by Brexit. The count
of subsidiaries is used as a proxy for the complexity of a rms GVC, with more complex GVCs
making a rm more vulnerable to the e¤ects of leaving the EU. An alternative interpretation
of the share of UK a¢ liates, however, is as a measure of exposure to the domestic UK market.
In the light of Daviesand Studnickas results, we expect all three variables to be negatively
correlated with abnormal returns.
4Throughout this paper, we are using the terms a¢ liateand subsidiary interchangeably.
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Third, we use information on a rms export and import status from Dun & Bradstreet to
construct three dummy variables for whether a rm is an exporter, an importer or an exporter-
importer.5 While these indicators do not convey any information about the intensity with
which rms trade, they are the best available proxies for rms involvement in international
trade. Given the steep depreciation of sterling on 24 June 2016, we would expect exporters to
benet from gaining competitiveness in foreign markets and importers to be negatively a¤ected
by the higher cost of foreign goods. Exchange rate e¤ects were smaller and less immediate for
the other two events, with the Lancaster House speech actually leading to a slight appreciation
of the pound. Hence, the expected sign and signicance patterns of the trade status dummies
are less clear for these events.
Fourth, our nal rm-level indicator is a dummy variable for whether a rm reports earnings
in a currency other than sterling, again obtained from Orbis. This variable serves as a proxy
for whether a rm earns a substantial amount of its prots in foreign currencies. If the pound
depreciates, earnings measured in pounds will increase which will tend to push up the rms
FTSE All-Shares stock price (which is quoted in pounds).6
We also include four sector-level regressors. First, we compute the share of EU migrants
in the workforce of an industry, using data from the UK Labour Force Survey published by
the O¢ ce for National Statistics.7 As explained in Section 2, given that high levels of EU
immigration were arguably a key driver of the Leave vote, it is likely that the UK will see
tighter restrictions on EU immigration after Brexit. Hence, we may expect sectors with a
higher share of EU migrants to see stronger negative abnormal returns. This should be true
for the reaction to the referendum result itself, as well as for the two speeches which explicitly
mentioned future restrictions on EU immigration.
Second, we include a dummy variable for industries that tend to outperform the market in
recessions. We use the classication by Emsbo-Mattingly et al. (2017) who classify consumer
staples, healthcare, telecommunication and utilities as recession outperformers.8 Since a ma-
jority of forecasters predicted a growth slowdown or even a recession in the event of a Leave
victory, we expect recession-proofstocks to do better on 24 June 2016.9 By October 2016,
however, it had become clear that the referendum result had not led to an immediate economic
slowdown. For example, the UK was still the fastest growing economy in the G7 at the end of
2016 (OECD, 2018). Growth eventually slowed during 2017 (Born et al., 2017), but this was
5Dun & Bradstreet provide information on whether the company is an exporter (Yes or No) or importer (Yes
or No) and we create a dummy variable for export and import status of the company using this information. If a
company is reported both as an exporter and importer, we classify that company as an exporter-importer. D&Bs
sources include annual reports, Company House reports, industry reports and a network of 5,000 employees who
check the accuracy of the data.
6We do not directly observe the geographic split of rm-level prots in our data. However, for a sub-sample
of rms we have information on the distribution of sales based on subsidiary data. This information shows that
rms reporting in a foreign currency do indeed earn a smaller share of revenues in pounds than rms reporting
in GBP, and that this share is also small in absolute terms (on average only 25% of revenues come from inside
the UK for rms reporting in a foreign currency).
7As is standard in the migration literature that uses this dataset, we focus on the country of birth of workers
rather than their citizenship to dene the share of EU migrants.
8See exhibits 6 and 7 in Emsbo-Mattingly et al. (2017).
9 In the month immediately after the referendum, there was indeed a sharp deterioration of indicators of
business condence. For example, IHS Markits Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) dropped from 52 in June to
47 in July 2016, a decrease of a magnitude last seen at the onset of the nancial crisis in 2008.
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not yet evident at the time of the Lancaster House speech. Thus, we do not expect a signicant
correlation between the recession-proof dummy and abnormal returns for our last two events.
Finally, we include two measures of rms exposure to future trade barriers between the
UK and the EU. For goods-producing industries, we use the EUs most-favoured nation (MFN)
tari¤s, which are charged on imports from countries that do not have a preferential trade
agreement with the EU.10 While the Lancaster House speech stressed that the UK would be
seeking EU market access through a comprehensive free trade agreement, it also did not rule
out the UK leaving the EU without an exit deal. In that case, the UK would have to fall
back on trade governed by WTO rules. This would imply facing EU MFN tari¤s as well as, in
all likelihood, imposing such tari¤s on imports from the EU. For services trade, future trade
restrictions are harder to predict and would take the form of non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs). If
the UK were to leave the single market, as implied by Mays Conservative Party conference
speech and explicitly stated in her Lancaster House speech, it would lose preferential access to
EU services markets. Moreover, rules and regulations would likely diverge from the EU over
time, leading to further increases in NTBs. Hence, we use the service trade restrictiveness index
(STRI) developed by the World Bank to measure EU member countriespolicies as applicable
to non-EU providers.11
For both tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers, we use two types of procedures to map trade barriers
to rms. First, we calculate an average across all the industries a rm is reported to be active
in; second, we use a narrower measure that only uses tari¤s and NTBs for a rms core industry
as reported in Orbis. We use the wider measure in our baseline specication because it yields
a signicantly higher number of observations. The narrower measure is included as part of our
robustness checks.
We start with data for all 636 companies in the FTSE All Shares at the time of our data
download (October 2017). We use the FTSE All Shares because it provides a broad-based
sample including rms with substantial international activities as well as more domestically
focused companies. We drop eight companies that only report data for the nancial year 2016
and with a closing date after the referendum.12 We discard a further 26 rms that do not report
nancial information at all in Orbis. For the estimation of the market model parameters in (1)
we require one year of pre-event stock price data, which leads us to drop another 26 companies
with short stock price time series. A substantial share (32%) of the remaining companies are
investment trusts.13 We exclude them from our baseline regressions because, in principle, they
can invest anywhere in the world and it is unclear what e¤ect Brexit would have on them.
There is of course also a problem of double-counting for cases where investment trusts invest
10We use ad-valorem equivalent tari¤ rates for 2015, which is the most recent year available in the World
Banks WITS database (our data source).
11Data are for the year 2008, the only year available in the STRI. The STRI tries to measure the e¤ect of EU
regulations that discriminate against foreign services or service providers.
12We only use nancial information for the year before the referendum because the Leave vote itself may have
directly a¤ected rmsnancial outcomes.
13 Investment trusts are collective investments where investorsmoney is pooled together from the sale of a
xed number of shares which a trust issues when it launches. This money is then invested in a similar fashion to
open-ended investment funds and in a variety of assets, such as listed equities, government and corporate bonds
or real estate from any region in the world.
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in other companies listed on the FTSE All Shares index.14 Finally, missing values for some of
the regressors used in our analysis reduce the sample further, leaving us with around 350 stocks
for our baseline regression. In addition to this baseline sample, we also consider a subsample of
rms in goods-producing industries (for which we observe EU MFN tari¤s) and a subsample of
service-producing rms for which we have data on EU NTBs as measured by the STRI.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables just discussed. Tables
2-4 show raw and abnormal returns on our three main event dates for the companies with the
ten highest and ten lowest raw returns. On 24 June 2016, companies from the construction
and related sectors accounted for 6 out of the 10 worst-performing stocks while precious metal
producers and other mining companies dominate among the 10 best performers. This provides
some rst evidence that investors seem to have dumped business cycle sensitive shares on 24
June 2016 in favour of safe-havenstocks such as gold producers like Acacia Mining or Randgold
Resources. By contrast, no clear pattern is evident on the other two event dates. Finally, note
that both average returns and abnormal returns were strongly negative on the day after the
referendum but not on 5 October 2016 nor on 17 January 2017. This is consistent with our prior
that the two later events led to less signicant changes in market participantsexpectations.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 5 shows our baseline results. Columns 1 to 3 look at abnormal returns on 24 June
2016, the rst trading day following the referendum, and columns 4-9 examine abnormal return
patterns on our other two event dates.
In column 1, we exclude our two trade barrier measures, allowing us to use the largest
possible sample (352 stocks). As seen, most but not all coe¢ cient signs conrm our prior
expectations. Firms reporting in currencies other than sterling experienced additional posi-
tive abnormal returns of around 3.6 percentage points. By contrast, increasing the share of
subsidiaries in the UK or the EU by 10 percentage points reduces abnormal returns by 0.9
percentage points and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. Contrary to the results reported in
Davies and Studnicka (2017), however, the latter e¤ect is not statistically signicant.15 Our
recession-proof dummy is also positive and signicant as expected, indicating that stocks in
industries which perform better during downturns experienced abnormal returns that were 3.6
percentage points higher. Finally, the trade status indicators broadly conform to our priors;
export status is associated with higher and import status with lower abnormal returns, and
exporter-importers saw abnormal returns of an additional 2.24 percentage points. With the
exception of import status, all trade indicators are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
The remaining regressors are all statistically insignicant. Contrary to Davies and Studnicka,
14As part of our robustness checks, we show that extending the sample to investment trusts does not qualita-
tively change our ndings.
15The insignicance of the EU share variable seems to be driven by the inclusion of regressors not used by
Davies and Studnicka (2017). After dropping the recession-proof and trade status dummies, as well as using
log(assets) instead of log(sales) as in Davies and Studnicka (2017), the coe¢ cient on the EU share regressor
becomes signicant at the 1% level.
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we do not nd a signicant e¤ect of the total number of subsidiaries.16 Our proxies for size
and protability (ROA and log sales) are also insignicant, as is the share of EU migrants in
an industry.17
Overall, abnormal return patterns on 24 June 2016 are mainly driven by the exchange rate
devaluation and the fear of a possible economic slowdown or recession. The signs and signicance
patterns of the non-UK currency dummy and the trade status indicators are consistent with
the expected impact of the sharp depreciation of the pound. The fact that stocks in recession-
proofindustries did signicantly better and that rms with more a¢ liates in the UK, and hence
more exposure to the domestic market, did worse points to the additional role of recessionary
expectations. Both sets of independent variables together explain around 34% of the total
variation in abnormal returns on 24 June 2016. Adding the remaining regressors from Table 5
only increases this slightly to 37%.18
What role did expectations of higher trade barriers play in explaining abnormal return
patterns? The results in columns 2 and 3, where we include tari¤ barriers for goods-producing
industries and non-tari¤ barriers for selected service industries, respectively, suggest that such
expectations did not matter as both trade barrier proxies are insignicant. We caution that
sample sizes are of course considerably smaller in both regressions, explaining why some of the
other indicators also become statistically insignicant. Interestingly, the share of a¢ liates in
the EU becomes signicantly negative in the goods-producing subsample regression (column 2),
possibly suggesting that dependence on EU supply chains is more important for manufacturing
rms. The only indicators that are consistently statistically signicant across all three samples
(columns 1-3) are the indicators we associate with expectations of a future recession (i.e., the
recession-proof dummy and the share of a¢ liates in the UK).
Columns 4-6 and columns 7-9 in Table 5 examine abnormal return patterns on our other
two event dates. As seen, the number of signicant variables and the overall explanatory power
of the regressors drop signicantly, in line with our prior that these events only led to relatively
minor changes in investor expectations. A number of interesting results emerge nevertheless.
First, the MFN tari¤ variable becomes signicantly negative on 5 October 2016, consistent
with Theresa Mays Conservative party conference speech signalling the intent to pursue a
hard Brexit.19 In terms of magnitudes, the coe¢ cient estimate suggests that a one percentage
point increase in future MFN tari¤s is associated with 0.045 percentage points lower abnormal
returns. Given that the average MFN tari¤ in our sample is 4.5 per cent, our results suggest
that the expectation of higher tari¤s was associated with negative abnormal returns of around
16Again, this seems to be due to the inclusion of additional control variables in our regressions. When we drop
the recession-proof and trade status dummies, the coe¢ cient on the number of a¢ liates decreases to  0:0052
and becomes statistically signicant at the 5% level.
17Looking across columns in Table 5, the impact of higher ROA is always negative but only statistically
signicant on two occasions. The coe¢ cients on log(sales) and the EU immigrant share are less stable and
sometimes switch signs.
18Using only the two recession proxies still yields an R2 of 26% and only using the exchange rate proxies an
R2 of 20%. By contrast, all the other regressors together only explain around 7% of the variation in abnormal
returns.
19 Inclusion of the MFN tari¤ variable also raises the explanatory power of the regression substantially from an
R2 of 7.5% to an R2 of 13%. In terms of R2 increases, it is the best explanatory variable for the goods-producing
subsample on 5 October 2016.
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0.2 percentage points in the average industry. However, this average hides signicant variation
across sectors. For example, the MFN tari¤ at the 90th percentile of the distribution of tari¤s
across sectors is 15 per cent and the maximum tari¤ (for the dairies and cheese making industry)
is 57 per cent, corresponding to abnormal return changes of 0.7 and 2.6 percentage points,
respectively.20
Second, MFN tari¤s are also associated with more negative abnormal returns on 17 January
2017, the day of Theresa Mays Lancaster House speech, although the e¤ect is smaller than in
October and statistically insignicant. By contrast, the STRI variable proxying for non-tari¤
barriers in the service sector is now negative and statistically signicant for the rst time.
A nal pattern that emerges on 17 January is that the two recession proxies (the recession-
proof dummy and the share of a¢ liates in the UK) now have the opposite signs to the post-
referendum day, although coe¢ cient magnitudes are much smaller in absolute terms. It is not
entirely clear how to interpret this result but it would be consistent with the generally positive
market reactions to the Lancaster House speech mentioned above.
To conclude, the abnormal return patterns on 24 June are best interpreted as capturing
the e¤ects of the steep depreciation of sterling and fears of an imminent growth slowdown or
recession. By contrast, future trade barriers and immigration shares across industries played
no role in explaining abnormal returns. There is, however, some tentative evidence that share
price reactions on 5 October and 17 January were at least in part due to expectations of higher
future tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers.21
5.2 Robustness Checks
Tables 6-12 present a number of robustness checks. We focus on what we consider the most
important checks here and report additional results in a separate online appendix.22
Table 6 uses two alternative measures for the importance of UK and EU a¢ liates, focusing
on the full sample of rms. Columns 1-3 use share data from Orbis based on the sales rather
than the count of a¢ liates in the UK and the EU. Columns 4-6 use segment data from the
annual accounts of parent companies which report the geographic breakdown of overall sales
20 It is standard practice in the trade literature to break down overall tari¤ changes into import tari¤s (payable
by EU exporters to the UK), export tari¤s (payable by UK exporters to the EU) and intermediate input tari¤s
(i.e., import tari¤s leading to increases in the cost of domestic producers importing foreign intermediate inputs).
Unfortunately, this decomposition is not feasible here. First, the most likely scenario is that the EU and the UK
will impose the same MFN tari¤s on each other in a WTO scenario. Second, we tried computing intermediate
input tari¤s using the UKs input-output matrix but given the level of aggregation available in UK IO tables, the
resulting tari¤ was highly correlated with the MFN tari¤ (correlation coe¢ cient of around 0.8). One case where
the exclusion of intermediate input tari¤s is clearly problematic is the sugar producer Tate & Lyle who mainly
use cane sugar and would benet from a possible lowering of UK import tari¤s after Brexit. Indeed, dropping
Tate & Lyle from our sample increases the MFN tari¤ coe¢ cient to 0.05.
21Note that, throughout, we are assuming that no rm-specic information is revealed on event dates that is
systematically correlated with our regressors of interest. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed enough data on
rm announcements to explicitly control for such potentially confounding factors.
22These additional robustness checks are: i) including investment trusts in our regression sample; ii) applying
a narrower denition of our trade barrier measures by using only data for a rms core industry rather than an
average barrier across all industries a rm is active in; iii) including dummy variables for broad NACE 1-digit
industry groups (Agriculture and Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction, Finance and Insurance,
and Other Services); iv) using a di¤erent market portfolio proxy for the computation of abnormal returns (the
MSCI Europe instead of the FTSE All Shares); and v) using a six-month instead of a one-year estimation period
for the computation of abnormal returns.
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(also obtained from Orbis). Both variables are likely to be better proxies for the importance
of the domestic and the EU market for UK-listed rms than share measures based on simple
counts of a¢ liates. However, this comes at the cost of a substantial decrease in sample size.23
The results are qualitatively similar to Table 5 although the proxies for the sterling depreciation
are less signicant.24
In Tables 7 and 8, we examine the sensitivity of our results to di¤erent specications of our
rst-stage market model estimation equation (1). In Table 7, we include three market indices in
addition to the FTSE All Shares: the S&P500, the MSCI Asia and the MSCI Europe. Ramiah
et al. (2013) argue that this is necessary to control for the e¤ects of asynchronicity, stock market
integration and spillover e¤ects in event studies. In Table 8, we allow for the possibility that
our events led to persistent changes in systematic risk. Following Ramiah et al. (2013) and
Breinlich (2014), we do so by interacting the market model equations stock-specic intercepts
and correlations with the market portfolio with dummy variables taking the value one after each
of the events.25 Both modications yield results that are very similar to our baseline estimates,
consistent with the notion that for short event windows such as ours, the exact model used for
the computation of abnormal returns is of lesser importance (see Andrade et al., 2001).26
In Table 9, we use overall instead of abnormal returns as the dependent variable in our
regressions (i.e., rit in the notation of Section 3). As we explained in Section 3, abnormal returns
are our preferred dependent variable because they control for stock-specic return patterns that
are unrelated to the event in question and might be correlated with our second-stage regressors.
This said, returns on the market portfolio are likely to have been driven by the events in question
to some extent, especially for our referendum event, so that we might not want to eliminate this
part of overall returns. In practice, however, abnormal and overall returns are highly correlated
in our sample. The correlation coe¢ cient between the two returns is 97% on 24 June 2016,
99% on 5 October 2016 and 95% on 17 January. Not surprisingly then, the results presented in
Table 9 are very similar to our baseline results.
Tables 10-12 explore the e¤ect of varying the length of our event windows. In Table 10,
we add the trading day before and after the event in question and use cumulative abnormal
returns over these three-day windows as our dependent variable. This does not signicantly
a¤ect coe¢ cient patterns for the referendum event (now 23-27 June 2016 as no trading took
place on the 25th and 26th). Signicance levels are reduced for the other two events although
23See the Appendix for details on how we compute these two alternative measures.
24We do not report results for the goods-producing and services subsamples because the number of observations
drops to as few as 50. Coe¢ cient estimates on the MFN tari¤ and STRI variables are almost identical to before,
although signicance levels drop. Depending on the specication, both remain signicant at the 10 per cent level,
however.
25That is, we now replace equation (1) with rit = i+ iRmt+
P
v dpost;v (i + iRmt)+ eit, where v denotes
our three events and dpost;v = 1 for dates on or after event v. Note that in order to be able to estimate this
new equation, we need to extend our original estimation period to include and go beyond our event dates. In
practice, we use data up to 31 May 2017.
26Note that allowing for persistent changes in systematic risk by augmenting the market model equation with
additional interaction terms is not suitable for controlling for more short-term changes in risk premia. To see this,
note that in the extreme, one might want to allow for event day-specic changes in market model parameters
which would mean tting observed returns perfectly, with no abnormal returns left to explain. Thus, we caution
that our results might at least in part pick up short-term changes in rm-specic risk perceptions in addition to
changes in the future protability of individual companies.
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the coe¢ cient on the MFN tari¤ variable is around 50% larger than before.
Table 11 uses time windows that are more specic to the events in question. As discussed,
the Leave vote came as a clear surprise to market participants so that using a longer pre-event
window does not seem appropriate. Instead, we extend our window to include an additional
trading week after the event, so the window now runs from 23 June to 1 July. By this time,
both the FTSE100 and the FTSE All Shares indices had regained their initial losses, so it is of
interest to see whether our coe¢ cient pattern remains the same over this longer event horizon.
For our two other events, it seems likely that at least some of the relevant information reached
market participants before the actual speeches, so we extend our event window to include the
entire trading week surrounding the event. This is su¢ cient to include other speeches at the
Conservative Party conference as well as interviews given to prepare market participants ahead
of the Lancaster House speech.27
For the referendum event, results for the longer event window are qualitatively similar
to before. Our proxies for recession expectations remain highly statistically signicant and
coe¢ cient estimates are larger in magnitude than for our baseline results. The same is true for
the dummy variable indicating whether rms report in a currency other than pounds, although
the e¤ect for the goods-producing subsample is not statistically signicant. Coe¢ cient signs for
for the trade status indicators are similar to before but statistical signicance is again lower.
Turning to the other two event windows, results are less consistent with previous estimates.
The signs on the two trade barrier variables are still negative for the Conservative Party confer-
ence speech event but no longer statistically signicant; by contrast, the MFN tari¤ variable is
positive (although insignicant) for the Lancaster House speech.28 This is surprising given that
information about the likely form of Brexit had leaked in the days prior to the two speeches and
casts doubt on whether market participants really based stock price valuations on likely future
trade barriers. By contrast, one of our recession proxies (the share of subsidiaries in the UK) is
now signicantly negative across two out of three samples for our second event (5 October).
These results indicate that the correlation between prospective trade barriers and abnormal
returns found earlier seems somewhat fragile and depends on the exact specication of the
relevant event windows. By contrast, the results related to sterlings depreciation and investors
expectations of a slowdown or recession are robust to short extensions of our event window. As
a nal robustness check, we extend the event window for the referendum event yet further, to 20
and 60 trading days after 24 June 2016, respectively. This allows us to check how long-lasting
the impact of the referendum on abnormal return patterns was. We note that these results
need to be interpreted with more caution than those for our shorter event windows. This is
because new stock-specic information that is unrelated to the Brexit referendum will become
27Two events of particular importance in this context were a brief speech by Theresa May on Sunday, October
2, and an interview of Philip Hammond, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the German newspaper Welt am
Sonntag on the Sunday before the Lancaster House speech. Both events provided information about the content
of the subsequent speeches. However, they were both more low-key than Theresa Mays main speeches on 5
October and 17 January, and the main negative reaction in currency markets only occurred after the 5 October
speech. This is why we focus on the dates of the main speeches in our baseline regressions.
28The inclusion of Tate & Lyle again seems to strongly inuence estimates for the MFN variable on 5 October
2016; as discussed previously, Tate & Lyle would stand to gain from potentially lower intermediate input tari¤s
after Brexit (see footnote 12). Excluding Tate & Lyle from the regression does indeed nearly double the coe¢ cient
on the tari¤ variable to -0.049, a magnitude similar to our baseline regressions.
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available in the weeks and months after the event, making the interpretation of cumulative
abnormal return patterns more di¢ cult. That is, the longer the horizon, the harder it is to
argue that abnormal returns are caused only (or at least mainly) by the event in question.
In addition, specication choices for the abnormal returns estimation equation (e.g., whether
or not additional market indices are included) become much more important over longer time
horizons, creating additional sources of noise.
Looking at columns 1-3 of Table 12, we see that results are still broadly similar for cumu-
lative abnormal returns over the 20 trading days after the referendum. The main di¤erence
to our baseline results is that the coe¢ cients on our proxies for exchange rate e¤ects (cur-
rency dummies, trade status indicators) are smaller and less signicant than before. On the
other hand, the coe¢ cients on our proxies for recessionary expectations (recession-proof dummy,
share of UK a¢ liates) have actually increased in size and signicance. Cumulative abnormal
returns over the 60 trading days after the referendum (columns 4-6) show somewhat weaker
patterns than before. The regression R2 is now only around 15%, compared to approximately
30% for the 20-day horizon and 35% for our baseline regression. The proxies for exchange rate
e¤ects are now insignicant although interestingly, coe¢ cient signs and magnitude are similar
to before, suggesting that the lack of signicance is mainly driven by increased noise. The
recession-proof dummy is now also slightly smaller in magnitude and insignicant throughout,
possibly reecting the fact that by September 2016, it had become clear that initial fears of an
immediate recession were unfounded. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient magnitudes and signicance
levels of the UK a¢ liate share variable are still very similar to our baseline results, indicating
that investors continued to take a negative view of rms with high exposure to the domestic
UK market almost three months after the referendum.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies stock market reactions to the result of the 2016 UK referendum on EU
membership and two of the main subsequent policy announcements that claried the likely
form Brexit would take, Theresa Mays Conservative Party conference speech on 5 October
2016 and her Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017. Besides providing direct evidence
on share prices movements, the purpose of this analysis is to use price reactions as a guide to
the likely future economic impact of Brexit and the channels through which such e¤ects might
materialise. To this end, we correlated stock price reactions with indicators capturing di¤erent
potential e¤ects of Brexit, including short-run impacts linked to the depreciation of sterling and
the possibility of a slowdown in economic activity, as well as measures of potential future tari¤
and non-tari¤ barriers.
Our results support the hypothesis that stock market participants expected an economic
downturn or even a recession in the days after the referendum. Share price movements during
this period were also a¤ected by the depreciation of sterling. By contrast, we nd little evidence
for the importance of variation in EU migrant shares across industries or future trade barriers in
explaining abnormal returns following the referendum result. When analysing market reactions
to Theresa Mays two speeches our proxies have less explanatory power, consistent with the idea
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that much of the content of the speeches was already known to investors. Nevertheless, there is
some evidence that abnormal return patterns were at least partially explained by expectations
about future tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers on the days of the two speeches. This result is less
robust, however, and depends on the length of the event window chosen.
While our analysis provides new insight into investorsexpectations about the consequences
of Brexit, real economic e¤ects will take time to materialise and market participants may be
wrong. Fears that the Leave vote would trigger an immediate recession were unfounded, but
the UKs economic growth has slowed relative to other major economies since 2016 (Born et
al. 2017). It is too soon to know how Brexit will a¤ect rms that engage in cross-border trade
or investment between the UK and the EU. Crucially, the impact will depend on the nature of
UK-EU relations after Brexit, which, at the time of writing, remain undecided.
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A Construction of Alternative Sales Share Measures
For our robustness check in Section 5.2 (Table 6), we use two methods to calculate the geographic
sales distribution of the rms in our sample.
A.1 Method 1 - Using Sales of Subsidiaries of the Parent Firm
We start with the subsample of rms from Orbis that had complete information about their own
sales (operating revenue) and the sales of their subsidiaries. Sales of each parent rm are the
sum of the sales of all its subsidiaries including any sales of the parent rm itself. Accounting
rules around the world (especially IFRS) require the parent rm to consolidate the nancial
statements of all its subsidiaries when the ownership of the parent rm is 50% or greater in its
subsidiaries.29 Therefore, we only use data for subsidiaries in which the parent rm has at least
a 50% ownership stake.
In principle, the sum of sales of all subsidiaries should be equal to the consolidated sales
of the parent rm but this is not the case in Orbis. There are 126 rms for which the sum of
sales of the subsidiaries exceeds the consolidated sales of the parent rm and we drop all such
companies, leaving us with a nal sample of 360 rms.
For these rms, we impute the sales of any subsidiary with missing sales data as follows. We
subtract the sum of available sales of all subsidiaries from the consolidated sales of the parent
rm and then divide the result by the total number of subsidiaries with missing sales data. To
illustrate, assume that the consolidated sales of the UK parent rm are £ 100 million (excluding
sales of the parent rm itself), that it has three subsidiaries and that sales information is only
available for one subsidiary located in Germany (sales of £ 50 million). The sales data for the
other two subsidiaries located in the United Kingdom and Spain are missing. Out imputation
procedure attributes the remaining £ 50 million equally across these two subsidiaries.
Finally, to compute the share of total sales of the parent rm originating from Europe, we
sum the sales of all subsidiaries located in Europe and divide it by the consolidated sales of the
parent rm (using 2016 data). Similarly, we compute the share of total sales originating in the
UK.
A.2 Method 2 - Using the Geographic Breakdown of the Sales of Parent
Firms
Orbis also directly reports the geographical breakdown of rm sales. The level of aggregation
used in the geographical breakdown is not homogenous, and information is sometimes for a
region (not a country) or even multiple regions. We classify sales as originating from Europe
if the geographic area of the sales of the parent rm is given as Europe only (or any of the
countries in Europe). We also classify sales as originating from Europe if the geographic area of
the sales of the parent rm is given as Europe and Asia(or Europe and Africaor Germany
and Ghana) instead of Europe alone. We adopt this approach because our aim is to calculate
the dependence of the parent rm (in terms of its sales) on Europe. Not classifying Europe
and Africaas sales originating from Europewill underestimate the dependence of the parent
rm on Europe.
Finally, we consolidate the sales originating from each of Europe and the UK, and divide by
total sales of the parent rm (using 2016 data) to calculate the sales shares. Missing data or
unsuitable geographic breakdowns of sales made it impossible to calculate segment-based sales
shares for the majority of rms in our sample, leaving us with information for only 181 rms.
29See http://stevecollings.co.uk/consolidated-accounts-in-the-uk-a-quick-guide/ (accessed 12/3/2018).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log(assets) 394 21.34 1.94 16.69 28.51 
ROA 393 0.05 0.10 -0.68 0.47 
Non-GBP Reporting Currency 394 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Share EU affiliates 394 0.18 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Share UK affiliates 394 0.53 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Log(number of affiliates) 394 4.16 1.46 0.00 8.32 
Log(sales) 380 20.73 1.78 14.52 26.30 
EU MFN (narrow) 138 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.57 
STRI (narrow) 88 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.55 
EU MFN (wide) 143 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.57 
STRI (wide) 152 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.55 
Share EU immigrants 394 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.46 
Recession-proof dummy 394 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Exporter 366 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Importer 366 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Exporter-Importer 366 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are calculated over the baseline sample of firms, excluding Investment Trusts.  
ROA, Non-GBP Reporting Currency, Share EU affiliates, Share UK affiliates, Log(number of affiliates), Log(sales), Exporter, Importer and Exporter-Importer are firm-level variables. EU MFN 
(narrow), STRI (narrow), EU MFN (wide), STRI (wide), Share of EU immigrants are sector-level variables. Log(assets) is the logarithm of the value of a firm’s assets. ROA is a firm’s return on 
assets. Non-GBP Reporting Currency is a dummy variable for whether a firm reports earnings in a currency other than sterling. EU MFN is the current EU most-favoured nation tariff applied to 
third countries for goods-producing industries, while STRI is the service trade restrictiveness index developed by the World Bank for services industries. “Recession-proof” is a dummy variable 
for industries that tend to outperform the market in recessions. Exporter, importer and exporter-importer are dummies for firms’ trade status. Narrow and wide refer to the type of industry 
mapping methodology used.  
Table 2: Best and worst-performing stocks on 24 June 2016. 
Company Name Industry (NACE 4-digit) Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
T-Statistic 
Top 10 performers 
ACACIA MINING PLC Precious metals production 17.0% 18.4% 5.69 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES LIMITED Precious metals production 14.2% 14.0% 5.64 
FRESNILLO PLC Other mining and quarrying nec. 11.9% 14.1% 5.96 
CENTAMIN PLC Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores 10.5% 11.3% 3.88 
HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC Precious metals production 6.0% 7.6% 1.71 
POLYMETAL INTERNATIONAL PLC Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores 5.8% 7.4% 3.50 
SIRIUS MINERALS PLC Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores 5.6% 8.1% 1.55 
NMC HEALTH PLC Other human health activities 5.0% 7.4% 3.39 
COMPASS GROUP PLC Restaurants and mobile food service activities 3.9% 6.6% 6.69 
HOGG ROBINSON GROUP PLC Travel agency activities 3.8% 4.7% 2.29 
Bottom 10 performers 
INTERN. CONSOLIDATED AIRLINES GROUP S.A. Passenger air transport -22.5% -18.3% -19.85 
GRAFTON GROUP PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY Other retail sale of new goods in specialised stores -23.7% -20.5% -11.20 
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS P L C Development of building projects -23.8% -20.2% -14.35 
BOVIS HOMES GROUP PLC Construction of residential and non-residential buildings -24.3% -20.6% -13.34 
BELLWAY P L C Construction of residential and non-residential buildings -24.5% -21.5% -12.00 
VIRGIN MONEY HOLDINGS (UK) PLC Activities of holding companies -24.9% -21.0% -12.57 
CREST NICHOLSON HOLDINGS PLC Manuf. of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction -26.5% -22.9% -9.79 
PERSIMMON PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY Construction of residential and non-residential buildings -27.6% -24.2% -12.67 
TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC Construction of residential and non-residential buildings -29.3% -25.6% -15.23 
ALDERMORE GROUP PLC Activities of holding companies -32.0% -28.7% -15.71 
Average across all companies in sample -6.4% -3.5% -11.14 
Notes: Table lists the best and worst performing stocks on 24 June 2016. We report each company’s main sector of activity, overall stock return and the 
abnormal return and associated t-statistic (computed following Campbell et al., 1997).  
Table 3: Best and worst-performing stocks on 5 October 2016. 
Company Name Industry (NACE 4-digit) Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
T-Statistic 
Top 10 performers 
TESCO PLC Retail sales, non-specialised stores 9.8% 10.4% 5.64 
ALDERMORE GROUP PLC Activities of holding companies 6.9% 7.5% 2.91 
RENOLD PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements 5.8% 6.2% 2.29 
KENMARE RESOURCES PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY Other mining and quarrying nec 5.1% 5.8% 0.80 
CAMBIAN GROUP PLC Other human health activities 4.6% 5.2% 0.94 
SPEEDY HIRE PLC Renting/leasing of other machinery, equip. & tangible goods nec 3.9% 4.4% 1.28 
JOHN MENZIES PLC Non-specialised wholesale trade 3.5% 3.7% 2.28 
ELECTROCOMPONENTS PLC Wholesale of electronic and telecomm. equipment and parts 3.3% 3.7% 1.90 
COATS GROUP PLC Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery nec 3.2% 3.3% 1.75 
STV GROUP PLC Television programming and broadcasting activities 3.2% 3.4% 1.50 
Bottom 10 performers 
COUNTRYWIDE PLC Real estate agencies -3.5% -3.0% -1.51 
CARCLO PLC Manufacture of other outerwear -3.7% -3.5% -1.20 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES LIMITED Precious metals production -4.0% -4.1% -1.66 
LSL PROPERTY SERVICES PLC Real estate agencies -4.0% -3.8% -1.99 
UNITED UTILITIES GROUP PLC Water collection, treatment and supply -4.4% -4.0% -4.56 
DEVRO PLC Manufacture of other food products nec -4.7% -4.4% -2.81 
LOW & BONAR PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY Manufacture of household & sanitary goods & toilet requisites -5.2% -4.9% -2.60 
POLYMETAL INTERNATIONAL PLC Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores -5.7% -5.7% -2.70 
HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC Precious metals production -6.1% -6.2% -1.39 
PAYPOINT PLC Activities of collection agencies and credit bureaus -6.2% -6.0% -3.70 
TOPPS TILES PLC Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equip. -8.7% -8.6% -5.04 
Average across all companies in sample -0.4% 0.0% 
Notes: Table lists the best and worst performing stocks on 24 June 2016. We report each company’s main sector of activity, overall stock return and the 
abnormal return and associated t-statistic (computed following Campbell et al., 1997). 
Table 4: Best and worst-performing stocks on 17 January 2017. 
Company Name Industry (NACE 4-digit) Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
T-Statistic 
Top 10 performers 
CAMBIAN GROUP PLC Other human health activities 7.1% 8.1% 1.47 
GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP PLC Manufacture of games and toys 6.3% 6.4% 3.53 
ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS PLC Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 4.4% 6.1% 2.89 
DECHRA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 4.1% 4.5% 3.08 
HARGREAVES LANSDOWN PLC Security and commodity contracts brokerage 3.9% 5.5% 4.24 
ZOTEFOAMS PLC Manufacture of other plastic products 3.9% 4.2% 2.42 
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL FINANCE PLC Activities auxiliary to financial services, exc. insurance & pension 3.7% 5.2% 1.87 
PREMIER OIL PLC Extraction of crude petroleum 3.6% 6.9% 1.29 
EASYJET PLC Passenger air transport 3.4% 4.3% 2.81 
MORGAN ADVANCED MATERIALS PLC Manufacture of other chemical products nec 3.1% 4.6% 2.63 
Bottom 10 performers 
KAZ MINERALS PLC Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores -3.1% -0.3% -0.07 
WOLSELEY PLC Wholesale of hardware, plumbing & heating equipment and supplies -3.2% -1.9% -1.48 
INTERTEK GROUP PLC Technical testing and analysis -3.2% -2.3% -1.65 
PZ CUSSONS PLC Manufacture of soap & detergents, cleaning & polishing preparations -3.5% -2.6% -1.68 
CARNIVAL PLC Sea and coastal passenger water transport -3.5% -2.3% -1.62 
JIMMY CHOO PLC Retail sale of footwear and leather goods in specialised stores -3.6% -2.6% -1.05 
VEDANTA RESOURCES PLC Casting of other non-ferrous metals -3.8% -1.5% -0.38 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO P.L.C. Manufacture of tobacco products -3.8% -2.9% -3.78 
FERREXPO PLC Mining of iron ores -4.0% -2.4% -0.40 
GULF MARINE SERVICES PLC Building of ships and floating structures -6.0% -5.2% -1.83 
HUNTSWORTH PLC Market research and public opinion polling -7.3% -6.9% -3.13 
Average across all companies in sample -0.2% 0.7% 
Notes: Table lists the best and worst performing stocks on 24 June 2016. We report each company’s main sector of activity, overall stock return and the 
abnormal return and associated t-statistic (computed following Campbell et al., 1997). 
Table 5: Baseline Results 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0568 -0.0546 -0.0508 -0.0292** -0.0249 -0.0400** -0.0141 -0.0135 -0.00457 
(0.0344) (0.0443) (0.0835) (0.0130) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0100) (0.0131) (0.0205) 
Log(sales) 0.00176 0.00802** -0.000739 0.000986 -0.000271 0.00257** -0.000461 -0.00205 -0.000166 
(0.00210) (0.00345) (0.00413) (0.000751) (0.00168) (0.00119) (0.000758) (0.00129) (0.00132) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0361*** 0.0251** 0.0301 0.00601 0.00417 0.00508 0.00123 0.00420 0.00337 
(0.00809) (0.0115) (0.0212) (0.00375) (0.00603) (0.00465) (0.00290) (0.00531) (0.00550) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0431 -0.0737*** -0.0458 -0.000184 0.00195 -0.00210 0.00394 -0.00328 0.0143 
(0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0803) (0.00661) (0.0146) (0.0112) (0.00629) (0.0110) (0.0120) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0946*** -0.0785*** -0.0934*** 0.00601 0.00747 0.00861 0.0120*** 0.0119 0.00818 
(0.0151) (0.0265) (0.0296) (0.00476) (0.0113) (0.00728) (0.00433) (0.00789) (0.00983) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00202 -0.00402 -0.00195 -0.000500 0.00158 -0.00107 0.000892 0.00141 0.00142 
(0.00290) (0.00482) (0.00673) (0.000834) (0.00187) (0.00131) (0.000945) (0.00151) (0.00170) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0178 -0.0275 0.00425 0.00293 0.00402 -0.00919 0.00244 0.00797 0.000812 
(0.0324) (0.0243) (0.0795) (0.0135) (0.0155) (0.0213) (0.00887) (0.0120) (0.0230) 
Recession-proof 0.0356*** 0.0195** 0.0606*** -0.00402 -0.00188 -0.00592 -0.00628** -0.00663* -0.0113** 
(0.00779) (0.00758) (0.0143) (0.00351) (0.00321) (0.00829) (0.00259) (0.00334) (0.00489) 
Exporter 0.0139** 0.000739 0.0319** 0.00578** 0.00765 0.00186 -0.000489 0.00122 -0.00216 
(0.00685) (0.0111) (0.0135) (0.00239) (0.00562) (0.00439) (0.00215) (0.00353) (0.00429) 
Importer -0.00160 -0.00730 0.00561 0.00731** 0.0116 0.00374 0.000656 0.00109 -0.00400 
(0.00796) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.00353) (0.00694) (0.00607) (0.00185) (0.00437) (0.00282) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0224** 0.0235 0.0112 -0.00539 -0.00702 -0.00363 -0.00388 -0.00473 0.0104 
(0.00997) (0.0148) (0.0179) (0.00502) (0.00824) (0.00984) (0.00485) (0.00558) (0.00794) 
EU MFN_broad -0.0267 -0.0446** -0.0137 
(0.0393) (0.0208) (0.0150) 
STRI_broad 0.0819 0.00173 -0.0247* 
(0.0505) (0.0177) (0.0132) 
Observations 352 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.372 0.398 0.339 0.075 0.131 0.098 0.071 0.143 0.099 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s 
speech at the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimate the baseline equation for the 
overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) estimate the baseline equation including 
the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Alternative Measures for Importance of UK and EU Affiliates (columns 1-3: sales shares; columns 4-6: segment sales) 
Date 24-Jun-16 17-Oct-16 17-Jan-17 24-Jun-16 17-Oct-16 17-Jan-17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0488 -0.0201 -0.0145 -0.122** -0.0292 -0.0276 
(0.0356) (0.0129) (0.0108) (0.0530) (0.0260) (0.0264) 
Log(sales) 0.00453* 0.000679 -0.000770 0.00109 0.000533 0.000602 
(0.00254) (0.000848) (0.000702) (0.00398) (0.00112) (0.00154) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0332*** 0.00762* 0.00366 0.0131 0.00750 0.00604 
(0.00860) (0.00407) (0.00325) (0.00926) (0.00495) (0.00508) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0601** -0.00455 0.00255 -0.0446 -0.00293 0.00981 
(0.0252) (0.00797) (0.00707) (0.0273) (0.00810) (0.00941) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0919*** 0.00620 0.0120** -0.111*** -0.00311 0.0170*** 
(0.0159) (0.00504) (0.00472) (0.0177) (0.00510) (0.00495) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00195 -0.00131 0.000642 -0.00500 -0.00140 0.000818 
(0.00403) (0.00103) (0.000900) (0.00336) (0.00123) (0.00150) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0432 -0.000228 -0.00579 -0.0165 0.00541 0.0192 
(0.0356) (0.0171) (0.0106) (0.0490) (0.0180) (0.0190) 
Recession-proof 0.0303*** -0.00396 -0.00449* 0.0509*** -0.00355 -0.00435 
(0.00694) (0.00391) (0.00265) (0.00953) (0.00541) (0.00533) 
Exporter 0.0140* 0.00495* 0.000461 0.00839 0.00867** 0.00449 
(0.00764) (0.00271) (0.00230) (0.00847) (0.00338) (0.00396) 
Importer -0.00676 0.00866** 0.00242 -0.0108 0.00733* 0.00170 
(0.00885) (0.00401) (0.00221) (0.0135) (0.00432) (0.00342) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0236** -0.00410 -0.00496 0.0198 -0.0158** -0.0183 
(0.0116) (0.00599) (0.00531) (0.0174) (0.00706) (0.0112) 
Observations 294 295 295 149 149 149 
R-squared 0.374 0.085 0.070 0.516 0.113 0.136 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is the abnormal returns on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the abnormal returns after Theresa 
May’s speech at the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1)-(3) estimate the baseline equation for the 
overall sample using sales shares from Orbis rather than affiliate count to measure the importance of EU and UK affiliates. Columns (4)-(6) estimate the baseline equation using segment data from the annual 
accounts of parent companies, which report the geographic breakdown of overall sales. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Augmented Abnormal Return Regressions (Four Market Indices: FTSE All Shares, S&P 500, MSCI Asia, MSCI Europe) 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.101*** -0.120*** -0.0806 -0.0225 -0.0150 -0.0349** 0.00166 0.0106 0.00539 
(0.0374) (0.0321) (0.0908) (0.0139) (0.0187) (0.0156) (0.0123) (0.0176) (0.0205) 
Log(sales) 0.00238 0.00855** -0.00240 0.000912 -0.000327 0.00278** -0.000730 -0.00226 0.000446 
(0.00213) (0.00366) (0.00410) (0.000771) (0.00168) (0.00115) (0.000787) (0.00136) (0.00121) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0413*** 0.0349** 0.0245 0.00487 0.00248 0.00522 -0.000427 0.000936 0.00572 
(0.00941) (0.0136) (0.0212) (0.00370) (0.00592) (0.00455) (0.00308) (0.00587) (0.00493) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0495* -0.0816** -0.0500 0.000934 0.00256 -0.000559 0.00660 -0.000214 0.0153 
(0.0277) (0.0324) (0.0772) (0.00688) (0.0157) (0.0112) (0.00664) (0.0132) (0.0108) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0956*** -0.0862*** -0.102*** 0.00632 0.00879 0.00965 0.0126*** 0.0149 0.0113 
(0.0169) (0.0284) (0.0300) (0.00481) (0.0117) (0.00700) (0.00443) (0.00920) (0.00894) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00242 -0.00446 -0.00165 -0.000480 0.00159 -0.00111 0.00106 0.00158 0.00127 
(0.00278) (0.00485) (0.00624) (0.000843) (0.00187) (0.00124) (0.000938) (0.00159) (0.00150) 
Share EU immigrants -0.00207 -0.0357 -0.0167 0.00524 0.00421 -0.00756 0.0102 0.0118 0.00973 
(0.0363) (0.0319) (0.0849) (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0209) (0.0102) (0.0149) (0.0237) 
Recession-proof 0.0231** 0.00119 0.0547*** -0.00270 0.000130 -0.00522 -0.00151 0.000247 -0.00895** 
(0.00907) (0.0105) (0.0138) (0.00359) (0.00323) (0.00809) (0.00292) (0.00426) (0.00441) 
Exporter 0.0125* -0.00106 0.0272* 0.00630*** 0.00808 0.00283 -0.000112 0.00176 -0.000535 
(0.00694) (0.0111) (0.0137) (0.00238) (0.00564) (0.00441) (0.00225) (0.00404) (0.00427) 
Importer -0.000273 -0.00265 0.00415 0.00706** 0.0109 0.00399 0.000173 -0.000647 -0.00341 
(0.00875) (0.0144) (0.0125) (0.00347) (0.00673) (0.00594) (0.00220) (0.00520) (0.00287) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0255** 0.0238 0.0203 -0.00596 -0.00716 -0.00521 -0.00470 -0.00494 0.00702 
(0.0111) (0.0160) (0.0187) (0.00496) (0.00815) (0.00967) (0.00506) (0.00643) (0.00780) 
EU MFN_broad -0.000967 -0.0482** -0.0233 
(0.0447) (0.0212) (0.0180) 
STRI_broad 0.0628 0.00401 -0.0182 
(0.0501) (0.0171) (0.0127) 
Observations 352 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.376 0.437 0.334 0.059 0.111 0.100 0.057 0.122 0.076 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on 24 June 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative Party 
conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Abnormal returns are computed using MSCI Europe market portfolio. Columns (1), (4) and (7) 
estimates the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) 
estimates the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Allowing for Event-Induced Changes in Market Model Parameters 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0494** -0.0406 -0.0638 -0.0187** -0.0204*** -0.0234 -0.00142 -0.00270 0.0114 
(0.0226) (0.0362) (0.0474) (0.00775) (0.00632) (0.0158) (0.00559) (0.00805) (0.00761) 
Log(sales) -4.39e-05 0.00321 -0.00209 0.000398 -0.00104 0.00155* -9.91e-06 -0.000700 -0.000140 
(0.00137) (0.00244) (0.00253) (0.000536) (0.000922) (0.000849) (0.000297) (0.000502) (0.000554) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0135** 0.00565 0.0124 0.00373* 0.00217 0.00498 0.00153 0.00461** 0.00196 
(0.00546) (0.00786) (0.0142) (0.00203) (0.00338) (0.00352) (0.00126) (0.00187) (0.00192) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0289* -0.0442** -0.0292 0.00229 -0.00168 0.00723 0.00453 -0.00109 0.00143 
(0.0169) (0.0218) (0.0515) (0.00476) (0.00927) (0.00714) (0.00319) (0.00626) (0.00361) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0648*** -0.0513*** -0.0689*** 0.00675** 0.00501 0.00734 0.00227 -0.00610 0.00242 
(0.00936) (0.0167) (0.0195) (0.00307) (0.00663) (0.00492) (0.00217) (0.00505) (0.00266) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00201 -0.00268 -0.00280 -4.36e-05 0.00160 -0.000888 0.000313 -0.000588 0.000822 
(0.00171) (0.00315) (0.00370) (0.000629) (0.00124) (0.00112) (0.000461) (0.000739) (0.000908) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0210 -0.0114 0.0280 -0.00494 -0.0106 -0.00669 -9.55e-05 -0.00242 0.0124 
(0.0201) (0.0190) (0.0515) (0.00873) (0.00906) (0.0144) (0.00469) (0.00451) (0.00889) 
Recession-proof 0.0235*** 0.0183*** 0.0384*** -0.00237 0.000740 -6.13e-05 -0.000943 -0.000354 -0.00150 
(0.00447) (0.00504) (0.00954) (0.00244) (0.00293) (0.00527) (0.00111) (0.00126) (0.00157) 
Exporter 0.00363 -0.00610 0.0145 0.00275* 0.00259 -0.000174 -0.00169 -0.00278 -0.00264 
(0.00459) (0.00784) (0.00896) (0.00155) (0.00296) (0.00314) (0.00121) (0.00169) (0.00205) 
Importer -0.00280 -0.0120 0.00336 0.00294 0.00497 0.00331 0.000139 -0.00118 -0.00209 
(0.00518) (0.00931) (0.00745) (0.00230) (0.00388) (0.00419) (0.00136) (0.00323) (0.00184) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0161** 0.0242** 0.0115 -0.00190 -0.00116 -0.00208 0.000321 0.00205 0.00327 
(0.00708) (0.0103) (0.0126) (0.00341) (0.00518) (0.00641) (0.00200) (0.00374) (0.00335) 
EU MFN_broad -0.0216 -0.0228* 0.000638 
(0.0268) (0.0124) (0.00706) 
STRI_broad 0.0545* -0.00487 -0.00287 
(0.0300) (0.0104) (0.00595) 
Observations 352 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.319 0.293 0.327 0.058 0.134 0.108 0.023 0.106 0.058 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on 24 June 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative Party 
conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Abnormal returns are computed using MSCI Europe market portfolio. Columns (1), (4) and (7) 
estimates the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) 
estimates the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Overall Returns as Dependent Variable 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0228 0.00428 -0.00957 -0.0214* -0.0124 -0.0315** -0.00105 0.00840 0.0106 
(0.0338) (0.0403) (0.0803) (0.0128) (0.0161) (0.0153) (0.00953) (0.0134) (0.0180) 
Log(sales) -0.00259 0.00166 -0.00453 0.000336 -0.00119 0.00198* -0.00186** -0.00407*** -0.00140 
(0.00229) (0.00403) (0.00430) (0.000738) (0.00152) (0.00114) (0.000777) (0.00133) (0.00126) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0251*** 0.0189 0.0211 0.00437 0.00325 0.00368 -0.00231 0.00220 0.000432 
(0.00828) (0.0131) (0.0217) (0.00334) (0.00524) (0.00424) (0.00256) (0.00515) (0.00467) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0338 -0.0694** -0.0396 0.00122 0.00228 -0.00123 0.00700 -0.00215 0.0162 
(0.0274) (0.0297) (0.0800) (0.00653) (0.0142) (0.0108) (0.00608) (0.0106) (0.0119) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0915*** -0.0716** -0.0922*** 0.00616 0.00838 0.00855 0.0128*** 0.0140* 0.00840 
(0.0147) (0.0277) (0.0297) (0.00469) (0.0108) (0.00677) (0.00412) (0.00714) (0.00866) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00284 -0.00292 -0.00269 -0.000652 0.00174 -0.00123 0.000605 0.00176 0.00115 
(0.00289) (0.00529) (0.00678) (0.000831) (0.00175) (0.00126) (0.000947) (0.00147) (0.00163) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0252 -0.0255 0.00930 0.00476 0.00476 -0.00695 0.00538 0.00897 0.00362 
(0.0333) (0.0264) (0.0812) (0.0130) (0.0142) (0.0218) (0.00826) (0.0120) (0.0215) 
Recession-proof 0.0437*** 0.0261*** 0.0701*** -0.00267 -0.000925 -0.00443 -0.00359 -0.00453 -0.00817* 
(0.00823) (0.00797) (0.0152) (0.00344) (0.00295) (0.00814) (0.00246) (0.00333) (0.00472) 
Exporter 0.0139* -0.00189 0.0371*** 0.00564** 0.00701 0.00251 -0.000595 0.000173 -0.000591 
(0.00727) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.00228) (0.00501) (0.00431) (0.00210) (0.00360) (0.00416) 
Importer -0.00512 -0.0180 0.00914 0.00675* 0.00976 0.00444 -0.000504 -0.00252 -0.00273 
(0.00806) (0.0167) (0.0125) (0.00344) (0.00639) (0.00609) (0.00190) (0.00506) (0.00258) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0250** 0.0306* 0.00675 -0.00506 -0.00598 -0.00446 -0.00305 -0.00246 0.00880 
(0.0102) (0.0169) (0.0191) (0.00482) (0.00762) (0.00986) (0.00473) (0.00607) (0.00751) 
EU MFN_broad 0.00852 -0.0377* -0.00113 
(0.0453) (0.0195) (0.0150) 
STRI_broad 0.108** 0.00611 -0.0158 
(0.0518) (0.0174) (0.0122) 
Observations 352 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.313 0.260 0.321 0.054 0.109 0.072 0.117 0.228 0.098 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the overall return on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the overall return after Theresa May’s speech at 
the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the overall return after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimate the baseline equation for the overall sample. 
Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of 
NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Longer Event Windows (t-1 to t+1) 
Date 
23, 24, 27 
June 16 
23, 24, 27 
June 16 
23, 24, 27 
June 16 4-6 Oct 16 4-6 Oct 16 4-6 Oct 16 16-18 Jan 17 16-18 Jan 17 16-18 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) AR(t-1,t+1) 
ROA -0.0629 -0.0813 0.0133 -0.0159 0.0289 -0.0539* -0.0206 -0.0186 -0.00173 
(0.0501) (0.0764) (0.0914) (0.0262) (0.0380) (0.0299) (0.0154) (0.0236) (0.0346) 
Log(sales) 0.00214 0.0156** -0.00115 0.00234* 0.00505* 0.00372** -0.000232 -0.00259 -8.39e-05 
(0.00384) (0.00779) (0.00743) (0.00140) (0.00290) (0.00182) (0.00102) (0.00222) (0.00150) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0760*** 0.0525** 0.0668** -0.00804 -0.0264** 0.00510 0.00313 0.0155* -0.00233 
(0.0141) (0.0231) (0.0293) (0.00599) (0.0109) (0.00786) (0.00463) (0.00850) (0.00925) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0683** -0.107** -0.0845 0.00910 0.0359 -0.0172 0.00640 0.00257 0.000683 
(0.0338) (0.0496) (0.0797) (0.0157) (0.0329) (0.0174) (0.00975) (0.0182) (0.0159) 
Share UK affiliates -0.150*** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.00393 -0.00559 -0.00351 0.00108 -0.0129 -0.00369 
(0.0221) (0.0418) (0.0409) (0.00958) (0.0191) (0.0131) (0.00767) (0.0168) (0.0126) 
Log(# affiliates) 0.00251 -0.00658 0.00680 0.00164 -0.00152 -0.000381 -0.000553 -0.000715 0.000455 
(0.00529) (0.00934) (0.00948) (0.00167) (0.00365) (0.00201) (0.00126) (0.00290) (0.00200) 
Share EU 
immigrants 0.0155 -0.0524 -0.0664 0.0452** 0.0517* 0.0358 -0.00375 -0.0139 0.0597* 
(0.0462) (0.0525) (0.134) (0.0224) (0.0302) (0.0415) (0.0214) (0.0270) (0.0323) 
Recession-proof 0.0671*** 0.0260 0.101*** -0.00371 -0.00327 -0.0123 -0.00447 -0.0104* -0.00749 
(0.0110) (0.0161) (0.0250) (0.00710) (0.00713) (0.0112) (0.00442) (0.00619) (0.00697) 
Exporter 0.0234* 0.00240 0.0494** 0.00175 0.0154* -0.00951 -0.00152 -0.00648 0.00145 
(0.0120) (0.0214) (0.0238) (0.00471) (0.00905) (0.00762) (0.00448) (0.00720) (0.00557) 
Importer -0.00154 -0.00787 0.0163 0.00270 0.00389 0.000199 0.00981** 0.0164 0.00180 
(0.0141) (0.0265) (0.0260) (0.00496) (0.00838) (0.00821) (0.00465) (0.0105) (0.00554) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0391** 0.0342 0.0116 0.00508 -0.00939 0.00963 -0.00664 -0.0149 0.00452 
(0.0187) (0.0320) (0.0375) (0.00840) (0.0123) (0.0132) (0.00730) (0.0144) (0.00998) 
EU MFN_broad -0.0213 -0.0697* 0.0132 
(0.0705) (0.0416) (0.0264) 
STRI_broad 0.110 -0.0171 0.00660 
(0.0755) (0.0223) (0.0169) 
Observations 353 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.388 0.395 0.329 0.053 0.181 0.105 0.028 0.106 0.054 
Notes: Abnormal returns are computed over a three-day window. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns from 24 June to 27 June 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the 
abnormal returns from 4 October to 6 October 2016. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns for 16 January to 18 January. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimates the baseline equation for the 
overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) estimates the baseline equation including 
the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Longer Event Windows (Event-Specific) 
Date 23/6-1/7/16 23/6-1/7/16 23/6-1/7/16 3-7 Oct 16 3-7 Oct 16 3-7 Oct 16 16-20 Jan 17 16-20 Jan 17 16-20 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t-1,t+5) AR(t-1,t+5) AR(t-1,t+5) AR(t-2,t+2) AR(t-2,t+2) AR(t-2,t+2) AR(t-1,t+3) AR(t-1,t+3) AR(t-1,t+3) 
ROA -0.0846 -0.190*** 0.0493 -0.0504 0.000228 -0.100** -0.0445* -0.0276 -0.0794 
(0.0669) (0.0650) (0.133) (0.0353) (0.0407) (0.0385) (0.0238) (0.0304) (0.0616) 
Log(sales) -0.00661 0.00299 -0.0117 -0.00154 0.00424 -0.00297 -0.000661 -0.00366 0.00103 
(0.00451) (0.00798) (0.00915) (0.00176) (0.00256) (0.00244) (0.00124) (0.00281) (0.00224) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0642*** 0.0383 0.0674** 0.00738 -0.00888 0.0120 0.000883 0.0126 -0.0110 
(0.0154) (0.0230) (0.0296) (0.00780) (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.00626) (0.0106) (0.0148) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0674 -0.103 -0.0811 0.00257 0.0574 -0.0585** 0.00208 0.00549 -0.00515 
(0.0412) (0.0671) (0.0748) (0.0194) (0.0354) (0.0222) (0.0120) (0.0251) (0.0190) 
Share UK affiliates -0.164*** -0.156*** -0.127*** -0.0341*** -0.0255 -0.0430*** -0.00129 -0.000211 -0.0139 
(0.0243) (0.0526) (0.0416) (0.0118) (0.0213) (0.0158) (0.00862) (0.0216) (0.0172) 
Log(# affiliates) 0.00310 -0.00773 0.00889 0.000963 -0.00164 -0.000663 -0.00182 0.00240 -0.00347 
(0.00485) (0.00997) (0.0116) (0.00218) (0.00333) (0.00229) (0.00183) (0.00378) (0.00347) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0203 -0.0185 -0.0789 0.0375 0.0235 0.0358 -0.0100 -0.0291 0.0429 
(0.0578) (0.0672) (0.136) (0.0287) (0.0354) (0.0534) (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0371) 
Recession-proof 0.0951*** 0.0483*** 0.135*** -0.00369 -0.0142* -0.00523 -0.00797 -0.0203*** -0.0121 
(0.0155) (0.0143) (0.0308) (0.00793) (0.00791) (0.0156) (0.00574) (0.00577) (0.00793) 
Exporter 0.0120 -0.0245 0.0365 0.00543 0.0208* -0.0142 0.00317 0.000537 0.00941 
(0.0130) (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.00569) (0.0107) (0.00868) (0.00548) (0.00963) (0.00756) 
Importer -0.00884 -0.0448 0.0371 0.00760 0.0100 0.00579 0.0134* 0.0273* 0.00672 
(0.0167) (0.0373) (0.0233) (0.00583) (0.0125) (0.0108) (0.00696) (0.0158) (0.00742) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0339 0.0699* -0.0233 0.00499 -0.00595 0.0123 -0.0113 -0.0314* 0.000432 
(0.0222) (0.0374) (0.0381) (0.0107) (0.0170) (0.0193) (0.00972) (0.0187) (0.0147) 
EU MFN_broad 0.00463 -0.0300 0.0430 
(0.0810) (0.0456) (0.0405) 
STRI_broad 0.184* -0.0303 -0.000514 
(0.102) (0.0233) (0.0186) 
Observations 353 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.388 0.395 0.329 0.053 0.181 0.105 0.028 0.106 0.054 
Notes: Abnormal returns are computed over specific window. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns from 23 June to 1 July 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the 
abnormal returns from 3 October to 7 October 2016. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns for 16 January to 20 January. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimates the baseline equation for the 
overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) estimates the baseline equation including 
the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 12: Longer Event Windows for the Referendum Event (20 and 60 days) 
Date 23/6-20/7/16 23/6-20/7/16 23/6-20/7/16 23/6-14/9/16 23/6-14/9/16 23/6-14/9/16 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES AR(t-1,t+20) AR(t-1,t+20) AR(t-1,t+20) AR(t-1,t+60) AR(t-1,t+60) AR(t-1,t+60) 
ROA -0.00314 -0.183** 0.0675 -0.117 -0.303*** -0.00538 
(0.0981) (0.0709) (0.139) (0.128) (0.0829) (0.170) 
Log(sales) -0.00660 -0.00444 -0.0101 -0.0147** -0.0203** -0.0160* 
(0.00489) (0.00954) (0.00787) (0.00585) (0.00958) (0.00884) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0207 0.0221 0.00310 0.0288 0.0507 -0.00710 
(0.0192) (0.0248) (0.0344) (0.0263) (0.0426) (0.0423) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0754 -0.123 -0.0912 0.0184 0.0167 -0.0809 
(0.0547) (0.0912) (0.107) (0.0690) (0.142) (0.110) 
Share UK affiliates -0.211*** -0.230*** -0.211*** -0.0917** -0.129 -0.131** 
(0.0281) (0.0604) (0.0421) (0.0369) (0.0839) (0.0633) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00260 -0.00699 0.00214 -0.000674 0.00137 0.000561 
(0.00590) (0.0128) (0.0124) (0.00690) (0.0142) (0.0116) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0368 -0.00405 -0.0157 0.0197 -0.0454 -0.0847 
(0.0579) (0.0610) (0.127) (0.0729) (0.0718) (0.138) 
Recession-proof 0.0676*** 0.0305 0.0937*** 0.0267 -0.00694 0.0526 
(0.0159) (0.0193) (0.0291) (0.0180) (0.0245) (0.0447) 
Exporter -0.000232 -0.0405 0.00596 0.0236 -0.00369 0.0345 
(0.0165) (0.0309) (0.0253) (0.0197) (0.0297) (0.0316) 
Importer -0.00918 -0.0307 -0.00275 0.00976 0.00288 0.0196 
(0.0159) (0.0344) (0.0198) (0.0210) (0.0459) (0.0231) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0464* 0.0625 0.0515 0.0205 0.00966 0.0413 
(0.0269) (0.0461) (0.0337) (0.0364) (0.0617) (0.0626) 
EU MFN_broad 0.0341 0.0696 
(0.0786) (0.0963) 
STRI_broad 0.119 0.0939 
(0.0907) (0.0782) 
Observations 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.288 0.282 0.277 0.112 0.182 0.158 
Notes: Abnormal returns are computed over specific windows. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns from 23 June to 20 July 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the 
abnormal returns from 23 June to 14 September 2016. Columns (1) and (4) estimate the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2) and (5) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of the 
MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3) and (6) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 
the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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This appendix provides results from a number of additional robustness checks not reported in
the paper: i) including investment trusts in our regression sample; ii) using a narrower denition
of our trade barrier measures by using only data for a rms core industry rather than an average
barrier across all industries a rm is active in; iii) including dummy variables for broad NACE
1-digit industry groups (Agriculture and Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction,
Finance and Insurance, and Other Services); iv) using a di¤erent market portfolio proxy for the
computation of abnormal returns (the MSCI Europe instead of the FTSE All Shares); and v)
using a shorter estimation period (six months instead of a one year).
The results in Table A.1 are based on a larger regression sample that also includes investment
trusts. This increases our sample size by around 50% but leaves the results on 24 June 2016
broadly intact. In particular, the recession and sterling depreciation proxies retain their signs
and signicance although the export status variable is now only statistically signicant at the
15% level. One exception is that the share of EU a¢ liates is now statistically signicant for
the full sample in column 1. However, the coe¢ cient magnitude is very similar to Table 5,
suggesting that it is the increase in sample size that led to the gain in statistical signicance.
The results for the other two event dates are also broadly similar to before. Note that since
investment trusts are not in the goods-producing sector, we do not observe MFN tari¤s for them,
and the results in columns 2, 5 and 8 are basically identical to before.1 By contrast, the STRI
contains a measure of restrictiveness for nancial services which is what we use for investment
trusts. We acknowledge that the restrictiveness indicated by the STRI might not be relevant
for investment trusts who are likely to be less a¤ected by issues such as passporting rights after
Brexit. The coe¢ cient estimate on the STRI variable does indeed drop on 17 January 2017
compared to our baseline specication, indicating that measurement error might be a problem.
Table A.2 reports results for our goods and service producing subsamples where we apply a
narrower denition of our trade barrier measures by using only data for a rms core industry
rather than an average barrier across all industries a rm is active in. This further reduces
sample size, especially for the regressions containing the STRI. Nevertheless, results for both
trade barrier variables are very similar to before.
In Table A.3, we include dummy variables for broad NACE 1-digit industry groups (Agri-
culture and Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction, Finance and Insurance, and
Other Services). Note that we cannot include ner industry xed e¤ects because some of our
key variables only vary at the industry level. As seen, the results are broadly similar to the
robustness check of including investment trusts. The recession and depreciation proxies retain
their signs and signicance, with the export status variable again being less signicant and the
EU a¢ liates variable more signicant.
1The small increase in the number of observations from 131 to 133 is due to the fact that we now use the log
of a rms total assets as a proxy for size. While we believe that rm sales are a better indicator, they are not
available for investment trusts, hence the switch to total assets.
1
Finally, in Tables A.4 and A.5, we further examine the robustness of our results to di¤erent
specications for the estimation of abnormal returns. In Table A.4 we use a di¤erent market
portfolio (the MSCI Europe instead of the FTSE All Shares) and in Table A.5 we use a di¤erent
length for the estimation period (six months instead of a one year). Both modications again
leave the baseline results essentially unchanged.
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Table A.1: Sample with Investment Trusts 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0694** -0.0480 -0.0390 -0.0257** -0.0253 -0.0248* -0.0138 -0.0190 -0.0137 
(0.0299) (0.0346) (0.0419) (0.0109) (0.0174) (0.0148) (0.00878) (0.0135) (0.0126) 
Log(assets) -0.00360 0.00936*** -0.00322 0.000306 -9.82e-05 0.000448 0.000209 -0.00246* -4.60e-05 
(0.00258) (0.00339) (0.00239) (0.00103) (0.00172) (0.00119) (0.000724) (0.00133) (0.000748) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0389*** 0.0201* 0.0286* 0.00197 0.00390 -0.00170 0.000877 0.00596 0.00449 
(0.00877) (0.0110) (0.0157) (0.00389) (0.00585) (0.00505) (0.00246) (0.00557) (0.00387) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0358** -0.0727*** -0.0268 -0.00427 0.00181 -0.00138 0.00510 -0.00224 0.00986** 
(0.0159) (0.0262) (0.0201) (0.00361) (0.0145) (0.00315) (0.00335) (0.0107) (0.00459) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0796*** -0.0749*** -0.0620*** -0.00495 0.00744 -0.00521 0.0112*** 0.0120 0.00965*** 
(0.0154) (0.0267) (0.0117) (0.00314) (0.0113) (0.00361) (0.00212) (0.00802) (0.00233) 
Log(# affiliates) 0.00160 -0.00517 0.00172 -0.000474 0.00141 -0.000223 0.000720 0.00155 0.00145** 
(0.00279) (0.00461) (0.00380) (0.000869) (0.00170) (0.000981) (0.000620) (0.00128) (0.000718) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0404 -0.0138 0.0272 0.0148 0.00398 0.0207 0.00358 0.00582 0.00334 
(0.0325) (0.0269) (0.0536) (0.0124) (0.0159) (0.0191) (0.00645) (0.0117) (0.0146) 
Recession-proof 0.0354*** 0.0155* 0.0467*** -0.00463 -0.00183 -0.00355 -0.00656*** -0.00565 -0.0100*** 
(0.00790) (0.00852) (0.0135) (0.00365) (0.00317) (0.00813) (0.00248) (0.00351) (0.00349) 
Exporter 0.00871 0.00238 0.0178* 0.00241 0.00766 -0.00366 -0.000386 0.000937 -0.000513 
(0.00563) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.00233) (0.00578) (0.00382) (0.00184) (0.00330) (0.00355) 
Importer -0.00452 -0.00103 -0.00453 0.00446 0.0115* -0.00105 0.00119 0.000759 -0.00171 
(0.00915) (0.0148) (0.0105) (0.00336) (0.00679) (0.00545) (0.00180) (0.00418) (0.00237) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0237** 0.0171 0.0252 -0.00259 -0.00698 0.00645 -0.00386 -0.00335 0.00747 
(0.0106) (0.0156) (0.0152) (0.00430) (0.00789) (0.00775) (0.00442) (0.00537) (0.00676) 
EU MFN_broad -0.0266 -0.0454** -0.0166 
(0.0371) (0.0202) (0.0131) 
STRI_broad 0.0402 0.00927 -0.0172 
(0.0410) (0.0154) (0.0132) 
Investment trust 0.0311*** 0.0534*** 0.00219 -0.00188 -0.00531*** -0.00863** 
(0.0101) (0.0151) (0.00256) (0.00432) (0.00169) (0.00387) 
Observations 519 133 266 520 133 266 520 133 266 
R-squared 0.385 0.386 0.422 0.056 0.136 0.048 0.110 0.152 0.186 
Notes: Overall sample includes Investment Trusts. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is 
the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1), (4) and (7) 
estimate the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) 
estimate the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.2: Narrow Definition of Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers 
Date 24 June 2016 24 June 2016 5 Oct 2016 5 Oct 2016 17 Jan 2017 17 Jan 2017 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0553 0.0202 -0.0251 -0.0280* -0.0132 0.000891 
(0.0446) (0.0893) (0.0169) (0.0149) (0.0133) (0.0207) 
Log(sales) 0.00811** -0.00291 -0.000365 0.00302** -0.00227* 0.000596 
(0.00349) (0.00343) (0.00173) (0.00129) (0.00128) (0.00136) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0250** 0.0463* 0.00399 0.00487 0.00396 -0.00674 
(0.0115) (0.0235) (0.00602) (0.00498) (0.00545) (0.00523) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0755*** -0.109 0.00310 -0.00772 -0.00354 0.0163 
(0.0276) (0.0728) (0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0112) (0.0151) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0785*** -0.0651** 0.00933 0.0143* 0.0106 9.61e-05 
(0.0280) (0.0244) (0.0118) (0.00811) (0.00823) (0.0113) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00381 0.00471 0.00201 -0.00121 0.00174 0.00229 
(0.00522) (0.00730) (0.00201) (0.00139) (0.00158) (0.00237) 
Share EU immigrants -0.0319 -0.120 0.00231 0.0572 0.00937 -0.0187 
(0.0244) (0.133) (0.0155) (0.0597) (0.0122) (0.0421) 
Recession-proof 0.0192** 0.0544*** -0.00190 0.00600 -0.00707** -0.0158*** 
(0.00791) (0.0185) (0.00334) (0.0144) (0.00342) (0.00538) 
Exporter -0.000752 0.0303* 0.00748 0.000373 0.000636 -0.00838* 
(0.0119) (0.0159) (0.00592) (0.00493) (0.00386) (0.00487) 
Importer -0.00774 -0.000478 0.0112 0.00410 0.000865 -0.00809*** 
(0.0146) (0.0153) (0.00713) (0.00882) (0.00460) (0.00267) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0246 0.0158 -0.00692 -0.00341 -0.00478 0.0262** 
(0.0151) (0.0271) (0.00840) (0.0208) (0.00576) (0.0105) 
EU MFN_narrow -0.0204 -0.0482** -0.0116 
(0.0391) (0.0225) (0.0153) 
STRI_narrow 0.0714 0.00285 -0.0268** 
(0.0685) (0.0204) (0.0119) 
Observations 126 78 126 78 126 78 
R-squared 0.401 0.327 0.138 0.157 0.140 0.234 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s 
speech at the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimate the baseline equation for the 
overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimate the baseline equation including the narrower measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) estimate the baseline equation 
including the narrower measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.3: Industry Group Dummies 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0577* -0.0558 -0.0462 -0.0277** -0.0242* -0.0332** -0.0109 -0.0130 0.00357 
(0.0332) (0.0472) (0.0755) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0158) (0.0100) (0.0128) (0.0208) 
Log(sales) 0.00176 0.00737** 0.000267 0.00101 -0.000467 0.00293** -0.000557 -0.00211 -0.000314 
(0.00229) (0.00316) (0.00415) (0.000787) (0.00158) (0.00112) (0.000754) (0.00142) (0.00127) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0277*** 0.0321*** 0.0178 0.00136 -0.00299 0.000951 -0.00189 -0.000462 -0.00207 
(0.00873) (0.00957) (0.0224) (0.00422) (0.00878) (0.00398) (0.00254) (0.00491) (0.00447) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0615** -0.0731*** -0.0662 -0.000296 0.00195 -0.00197 0.00667 -0.00333 0.0200* 
(0.0257) (0.0266) (0.0758) (0.00682) (0.0141) (0.0116) (0.00590) (0.0108) (0.0113) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0928*** -0.0789*** -0.0957*** 0.00647 0.00902 0.0110 0.0119*** 0.0128* 0.00692 
(0.0140) (0.0261) (0.0272) (0.00462) (0.0116) (0.00669) (0.00377) (0.00755) (0.00906) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.000291 -0.00363 -0.00187 -0.000560 0.00214 -0.00106 0.000642 0.00170 0.00104 
(0.00337) (0.00445) (0.00692) (0.000920) (0.00200) (0.00135) (0.000929) (0.00167) (0.00164) 
Share EU immigrants 0.00159 -0.0213 -0.0353 0.00348 0.000810 0.000763 0.00321 0.00565 0.0134 
(0.0309) (0.0248) (0.0788) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0244) (0.00926) (0.0126) (0.0205) 
Recession-proof 0.0328*** 0.0205** 0.0492*** -0.00222 -0.000572 -0.00353 -0.00499* -0.00595 -0.00828** 
(0.00732) (0.00784) (0.0153) (0.00373) (0.00430) (0.00750) (0.00274) (0.00370) (0.00411) 
Exporter 0.00617 0.00243 0.0189 0.00485* 0.00679 -3.78e-05 -0.000497 0.000592 -0.00195 
(0.00756) (0.0113) (0.0138) (0.00272) (0.00530) (0.00408) (0.00245) (0.00355) (0.00425) 
Importer -0.00274 -0.00468 -0.00126 0.00636* 0.0104 0.00230 1.42e-05 0.000227 -0.00209 
(0.00779) (0.0140) (0.0120) (0.00364) (0.00696) (0.00609) (0.00184) (0.00442) (0.00291) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0255** 0.0213 0.0274 -0.00329 -0.00537 0.000724 -0.00326 -0.00362 0.0105 
(0.0100) (0.0146) (0.0201) (0.00502) (0.00772) (0.0101) (0.00481) (0.00572) (0.00795) 
EU MFN_broad -0.0203 -0.0456** -0.0149 
(0.0397) (0.0202) (0.0157) 
STRI_broad 0.0423 0.00190 -0.00777 
(0.0472) (0.0157) (0.0158) 
Observations 352 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.417 0.410 0.387 0.103 0.172 0.178 0.113 0.164 0.181 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s 
speech at the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Estimations includes a dummy variable for broad NACE 1-digit 
industries. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimate the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing 
industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.4: Different Market Portfolio (MSCI Europe) 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0952** -0.120*** -0.0910 -0.0254** -0.0180 -0.0351** 0.00119 0.0137 0.0141 
(0.0365) (0.0443) (0.0901) (0.0127) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.00973) (0.0139) (0.0177) 
Log(sales) 0.00577*** 0.0138*** 0.00205 0.000421 -0.00110 0.00207* -0.00253*** -0.00508*** -0.00190 
(0.00207) (0.00345) (0.00405) (0.000743) (0.00159) (0.00116) (0.000796) (0.00142) (0.00124) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0468*** 0.0328** 0.0357* 0.00458 0.00337 0.00390 -0.00408 0.00106 -0.000669 
(0.00952) (0.0126) (0.0212) (0.00344) (0.00555) (0.00437) (0.00264) (0.00549) (0.00455) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0529* -0.0805*** -0.0514 0.00106 0.00254 -0.00129 0.00866 -0.000864 0.0172 
(0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0794) (0.00660) (0.0146) (0.0108) (0.00612) (0.0109) (0.0118) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0980*** -0.0872*** -0.0973*** 0.00647 0.00838 0.00880 0.0137*** 0.0154** 0.00914 
(0.0163) (0.0267) (0.0303) (0.00471) (0.0110) (0.00688) (0.00416) (0.00725) (0.00831) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00144 -0.00517 -0.00119 -0.000603 0.00172 -0.00116 0.000531 0.00194 0.00109 
(0.00294) (0.00468) (0.00660) (0.000830) (0.00180) (0.00126) (0.000950) (0.00151) (0.00157) 
Share EU immigrants 0.00616 -0.0319 -0.00614 0.00371 0.00418 -0.00883 0.00595 0.00892 0.00297 
(0.0341) (0.0285) (0.0807) (0.0132) (0.0147) (0.0214) (0.00854) (0.0128) (0.0219) 
Recession-proof 0.0250*** 0.00828 0.0506*** -0.00304 -0.00106 -0.00472 -0.00228 -0.00304 -0.00669 
(0.00795) (0.00867) (0.0136) (0.00348) (0.00306) (0.00816) (0.00255) (0.00360) (0.00481) 
Exporter 0.0136** 0.00255 0.0262* 0.00581** 0.00735 0.00254 -0.000380 0.000134 0.000437 
(0.00686) (0.0102) (0.0141) (0.00231) (0.00528) (0.00431) (0.00215) (0.00374) (0.00422) 
Importer 0.00193 0.00329 0.00233 0.00686** 0.0102 0.00416 -0.00103 -0.00396 -0.00241 
(0.00863) (0.0137) (0.0128) (0.00347) (0.00661) (0.00607) (0.00207) (0.00549) (0.00270) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0206* 0.0172 0.0174 -0.00500 -0.00609 -0.00417 -0.00251 -0.00134 0.00815 
(0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0180) (0.00490) (0.00789) (0.00989) (0.00484) (0.00650) (0.00768) 
EU MFN_broad -0.0491 -0.0402** 0.00143 
(0.0377) (0.0199) (0.0157) 
STRI_broad 0.0546 0.00506 -0.0120 
(0.0499) (0.0174) (0.0123) 
Observations 352 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.428 0.518 0.361 0.061 0.119 0.078 0.159 0.289 0.112 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on 24 June 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative Party 
conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Abnormal returns are computed using MSCI Europe market portfolio. Columns (1), (4) and (7) 
estimates the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) 
estimates the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A.5: Baseline Results with Abnormal Return Estimates Based on Six-Month Estimation Period 
Date 24 June 16 24 June 16 24 June 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 5 Oct 16 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 17 Jan 17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) AR(t) 
ROA -0.0520 -0.0467 -0.0477 -0.0232 -0.0154 -0.0367** -0.00836 -0.00434 -0.00132 
(0.0350) (0.0455) (0.0853) (0.0144) (0.0195) (0.0162) (0.0109) (0.0139) (0.0204) 
Log(sales) 0.00211 0.00829** -0.000609 0.000935 -0.000370 0.00260** -0.000431 -0.00207 -0.000118 
(0.00202) (0.00325) (0.00392) (0.000770) (0.00175) (0.00123) (0.000795) (0.00129) (0.00140) 
Non-GBP currency 0.0346*** 0.0229** 0.0295 0.00488 0.00276 0.00492 3.26e-05 0.00261 0.00312 
(0.00768) (0.00995) (0.0207) (0.00394) (0.00620) (0.00450) (0.00311) (0.00544) (0.00536) 
Share EU affiliates -0.0448* -0.0724*** -0.0464 0.000305 0.00369 -0.00188 0.00391 -0.00162 0.0144 
(0.0260) (0.0252) (0.0785) (0.00704) (0.0159) (0.0110) (0.00674) (0.0122) (0.0119) 
Share UK affiliates -0.0921*** -0.0754*** -0.0902*** 0.00701 0.00973 0.00973 0.0133*** 0.0143* 0.00973 
(0.0153) (0.0256) (0.0299) (0.00489) (0.0116) (0.00719) (0.00440) (0.00832) (0.00945) 
Log(# affiliates) -0.00186 -0.00401 -0.00162 -0.000367 0.00171 -0.000983 0.00103 0.00151 0.00156 
(0.00277) (0.00469) (0.00633) (0.000855) (0.00193) (0.00134) (0.000965) (0.00153) (0.00174) 
Share EU immigrants 0.0122 -0.0331 -0.000830 0.00289 0.00407 -0.00814 0.00129 0.00689 0.000618 
(0.0311) (0.0217) (0.0770) (0.0141) (0.0161) (0.0218) (0.00944) (0.0128) (0.0241) 
Recession-proof 0.0324*** 0.0181** 0.0537*** -0.00413 -0.00133 -0.00702 -0.00702** -0.00648* -0.0135*** 
(0.00744) (0.00724) (0.0135) (0.00359) (0.00332) (0.00823) (0.00280) (0.00354) (0.00507) 
Exporter 0.0141** 0.00250 0.0298** 0.00579** 0.00812 0.00157 -0.000429 0.00195 -0.00280 
(0.00672) (0.0103) (0.0138) (0.00242) (0.00587) (0.00441) (0.00221) (0.00376) (0.00434) 
Importer -0.000853 -0.00674 0.00478 0.00732** 0.0114 0.00349 0.000813 0.00102 -0.00437 
(0.00799) (0.0139) (0.0119) (0.00347) (0.00697) (0.00597) (0.00192) (0.00449) (0.00285) 
Exp.-Importer 0.0210** 0.0225 0.0135 -0.00564 -0.00702 -0.00370 -0.00444 -0.00492 0.0108 
(0.00979) (0.0145) (0.0173) (0.00505) (0.00842) (0.00977) (0.00499) (0.00594) (0.00794) 
EU MFN_broad -0.0280 -0.0440* -0.0135 
(0.0340) (0.0223) (0.0166) 
STRI_broad 0.0776 0.000705 -0.0264* 
(0.0472) (0.0176) (0.0135) 
Observations 352 131 130 353 131 130 353 131 130 
R-squared 0.366 0.390 0.329 0.062 0.114 0.096 0.081 0.137 0.115 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the abnormal returns on 24 June 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative Party 
conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimates the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and 
(8) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6), and (9) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected 
services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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